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Abstract 
 
The theoretical model that has inspired the creation of Sophia Antipolis is governed by a 
top-down approach. The agglomerations externalities had not sprung up naturally from 
the dynamics of entreprises located in the cluster. The economic model of Sophia 
Antipolis is completely different of the traditional innovative district studied by Alfred 
Marshall (bottom-up approach). The aim of this paper is to understand the coordination 
mechanisms between enterprises and the main factors of success who made Sophia-
Antipolis the largest technology park in the Europe. Such a study presents the Top-down 
strategy of developpement choosen by the government from the origins of Sophia-
Antipolis to promote agglomeration externalities and the increasing returns to adoption 
gained by firms entering in the park. 

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Introduction 
 
Sophia Antipolis was created by the public authorities to attract high value added 
activities on the French Riviera, in the aim of strengthening a local economy driven 
historically by tourism. The creation of Sophia Antipolis forty years ago was, from the 
beginning, strongly supported by the French government by substantial public 
investments in telecommunication and transportation infrastructure.  
 
The theoretical model that has inspired the creation of Sophia Antipolis is governed 
by a top-down approach. By a top-Down approach, we mean an approach built on the 
sheer power of a centralized processor capable of replicate whatever the human 
intelligence can do. Such a definition of the top-down approach is inherited from 
Heyman and Leijonhufvud works (1996)1. Concerning the setting-up of Sophia Antipolis, 
the role of such a centralized power was played by the French ministry of Planning. 
 
The innovative pole of Sophia Antipolis had sprung up from a forrest located 
among the administrative territories of the cities of Valbonne, Antibes, Biot and 
Mougins2. Except many boars and squirrels, this territory had nothing in the seventies 
that could be qualified as innovative. Sophia Antipolis emerged only due to the strong 
desire of the French Ministry of planning (top-down approach). The agglomerations 
externalities, had not sprung up naturally from the dynamics of entreprises located in the 
cluster. The economic model of Sophia Antipolis is completely different of the traditional 
innovative district studied by Alfred Marshall (bottom-up approach). Nowadays, the 
cluster of Sophia-Antipolis is rich of external linkages, but poor of internal relations 
between the firms.  
 
In this local system of Innovation, a large numbers of actors in different sectors are 
present but any of them is sufficiently dominant to drive the cluster orientations. In this 
sense, this Local System of Innovation (LSI) is not reliable in the long run. Very few, 
almost no technological collaborations can be observed. The sustainability of the Sophia-
Antipolis cluster does not really depend on the territory. the weakness of the cooperation 
between companies of the cluster can be partially explained by the local multinational 
firms which have their branch facilities located in the local system of innovation but at 
the same time their head office external to the cluster with main decision taken from 
outside, limiting the potential for local synergies and local collaboration.  
 
Admittedly, a region needs good infrastructure and a pool of educated talent to 
develop innovative clusters. Nevertheless, public authorities can't manufacture 
innovation by putting a set of buildings, financial incentives or transportation facilities 
next to a university and next to research centres. 
 
In Sophia-Antipolis, much more than in other type of innovative poles, the role of 
incubators is tremendous. The need of effective incubators was felt from the early years 
of the park. Their role in a top-down approach of innovation lies in promoting the 
horizontal coordination between firms located in the cluster. In this intention, they have 
to compensate the lack of industrial and innovative atmosphere. 
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1
 Heymann D., Leijonhufvud (1996). P. 156. 
2The city of Antibes was named Antipolis at the time of the Ancient Greek. The word Sophia in the 
Ancient Greek Language means Wisdom.  

In this paper we propose to shed light on the necessity to have effective incubators 
in a technology park like Sophia Antipolis which is characterized by a tremendous lack 
of coordination between firms.  
After presenting the story and key factors of success of Sophia Antipolis (1.), the 
main coordination channels, between enterprises, are studied (2.). It then become 
possible to enlight the central role of the incubators in a top-down strategy (3.). 
 
 
1. The story of Sophia Antipolis from the early stages 
 
Sophia Antipolis was created ex nihilo in the seventies. The French government of 
that time did not want any more than the economy of the French Riviera is based solely 
on tourism. 
Admittedly, the emergence of a technological sector on the French Riviera is 
previous to the creation of Sophia Antipolis. During the period between the two world 
wars, an aeronautic industry was set up in Cannes and such an industry is still very 
dynamic nowadays. Currently the Thales Alenia Space Company provides 
communication satellites, and military rockets. During the same period, another 
technologic center devoted to electromechanics appeared in Nice. The emergence of the 
electromechanics industry in Nice with prestigious company like Legrand, was the 
breeding ground for the implantation of IBM and Texas Instruments on the hinterland of 
Nice. During the May 1968 protests, the touristic period on the French Riviera was very 
bad. The public administration in charge of the economic territorial planification, realised 
that the reliability of the French Riviera cannot be based on the sole tourism sector. 
Pierre Laffitte was the first to propose in 1969, the creation of  a new industrial cluster on 
the French Riviera devoted to the promotion of the scientific creativity and the 
technological transfers among innovative firms.  
 
The underlying strategy which has governed the setting-up of Sophia Antipolis 
includes three main actors namely, private innovative enterprises, the public University, 
the regional and local public administrations.  
 
In the early seventies, a semi-public company called Symival was created in the 
aim of structuring the emerging technopole and 5800 acres were acquired on a virgin 
plateau located on the administrative territories of the cities of Antibes, Valbonne, 
Mougins, Biot and Roquefort-les-Pins,Villeneuve-Loubet and Vallauris3.   
The implantation of the University in Sophia Antipolis was initiated in 1985 with 
the transfert and the creation of courses for postgraduates students (Master and 
Doctorate). Nowadays, 2 500 students from undergraduate to postgraduate levels and 
belonging to one of the 6 faculties in Sophia Antipolis are studying daily in this 
technological park. 
Sophia Antipolis has been firstly composed by entreprises which had a natural 
propensity to be easily relocated. Therefore, the earliest establishments of companies 
were in the sectors of computing and electronics (Air-France, Certiam, Organic, 
Télésystèmes, Questel, Thomson Sintra and Télémécanique). A second wave of company 
occured in the eighties with the implantation of Nortel, Lucent, Digital Equipment, 
Compaq... Nowadays, Sophia Antipolis is decidedly oriented to the knowledge economy. 
Newly relocated or created enterprises in the technological park product much more 

3
 Syndicat Mixte pour l’aménagement du plateau de Valbonne (Symival) 
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immaterial products (software, consulting services…) than real equipments ones. It is in 
this spirit that the SAP Company was established in early 2000s. 
 
Chart 1: Employment trends in the technology park of Sophia Antipolis 
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From the early stages of this cluster, newly established firms did not succeed to root their 
productive activity in the local environment. The geographical proximity did not promote 
positive externality or any agglomeration effect. The dynamics of this emerging territory 
was driven by the French ministry of planning through its institution called DATAR. 
 
 
2. The coordination of activities in the cluster 
 
The underlying theory of Sophia Antipolis is based on the idea that public 
authorities or economic development institutions by offering financial incentives, can 
create hubs of activity in specific industrial sectors by bringing businesses, researchers 
and suppliers together in buildings or industrial parks. Any government has the desire to 
promote the setting-up of technological park in which an industrial atmosphere is 
favorable for the outbreak and growth of firms. Sometimes, the industrial atmosphere 
emerge naturally from bottom-up coordination mechanisms. Such spontaneous 
emergence - like in the Italian Industrial districts -  of the industrial atmosphere were 
clearly described by Alfred Marshall (1890). The bottom-up approach relies on 
interacting networks and attempts to make networks evolve (Heymann, Leijonhufvud, 
1996). With a Bottom-Up approach the innovative pole is seen as a network of 
interacting entreprises, each one with less capability to process information than would 
be required of a central planning institution set to solve the overall allocation problem for 
the entire system. The Marshall’s conceptualization of the industrial districts teaches us 
that the benefits of agglomeration come from economic externalities. The externalities 
are the result of specifics characteristics built up over time and which cannot be 
transferred or replicated4. According to Alfred Marshall, enterprises located in the same 
district may benefit from lower transaction cost or sharing a common labor pool.  
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 Externalities are present when the actions of one agent affect the interests of another agent other than by 
affecting prices. 
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Concerning Sophia Antipolis, the French public authorities adopted an economic 
policy, implemented by the DATAR, which can be qualified as a top-down policy5. As 
recalled  by Rani Jeanne Dang (2009),  research and innovation in France have always 
been characterised by the intervention of public authorities. The term of "Colbertist 
State" is generally used to qualify the French system of innovation and research.  The 
Colbertist state is a  model based on the intervention of the state and which gives the 
priority to major civil programs, that put forward the supremacy of firstly the separation 
between research and firms and secondly the monopolisation of public supported by 
some large industrial groups. The Intervention of public authorities promotes the 
economic development and competitiveness of regions and cities by creating new 
business opportunities, by fostering entrepreneurship and incubating new innovative 
companies, by generating knowledge-based jobs, by building attractive spaces for the 
emerging knowledge workers and by enhancing the synergy between universities and 
companies.   
 
The Top-down strategy is not a French specificity. Others innovative clusters 
governed by a top-down approach exist in many countries. For instance, we can mention 
the "Parc Agrari del Baix Llobregat" in Spain, The “Technologiepark Ostfalen 
Magdeburg-Barleben” in Germany, The Japan's science city in Tsukuba and the "Silicon 
Pyramid" in Egypt3. Russia is currently setting-up a government-planned "science city" 
close to Moscow, that it hopes will one day rival Silicon Valley's. Over $200 million are 
spent by the public authorities to build a technology hub with innovative and competitive 
companies.  
 
Table 1: Workforce repartition in sophia Antipolis in 2011 
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 The “Délégation interministérielle à l'Aménagement du Territoire et à l'Attractivité Régionale” (DATAR) 
that is the Interministerial Spatial Planning and Regional Attractiveness prepares, promotes and coordinates 
the policies territorial planning held by the state. 
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The government doles out money to companies that it selects and appoints 
government administrators for the management of the cluster. Michael Porter (1990) 
assets that a governmental planning policy can create something from nothing, turning, 
for example, a forest (like in Sophia-Antipolis in France) into a technological park 
including highly competitive, innovative firms. By focusing on the population of 
enterprises in Sophia Antipolis, we can observe that only four different categories of 
economic activities represent 70% of the total workforce of the technological park 
namely, information technology, higher education/research, health science/fine chemicals 
and building (see table 1).  
 
23,9% of the enterprises in Sophia Antipolis belong to the Information technology (IT) 
sector but such a percentage matches 45,8% of the total number of the workforce in this 
technological park (see table 2). More than 300 Enterprises in the sector of the 
information technologies (like AMADEUS) represent nearly an half of the total 
workforce of the park. We can cast doubt of the technological aspect of the building 
activity.  If in term of workforce, 70% of the workers are distributed into four different 
economic activities, the range of the different economic activities in Sophia Antipolis is 
much wider. 
 
Table 2: enterprises repartition in Sophia Antipolis in 2011 
 
Activity Entreprises (in %) 
Information technology (IT) 23,9 
Higher Education/research 7,9 
Health sciences/Fine chemicals 7,8 
Building 5,1 
Common services 4,9 
Primary and secondary education 4,3 
Consulting 3,8 
Cleaning 3,6 
Equipment for home/office 3,5 
Miscellanous 3,4 
Health professions 3,2 
Real estate 3,1 
Public transportation 3,0 
Catering 1,9 
Earth Sciences 1,9 
Publishing, advertising, communication 1,7 
Travel agency 1,3 
Cars 1,3e 
Security 1,2 
Hotels 1,1 
Associations, clubs 1,0 
Others (<1% for each sector) 10,8 
Total 100,0 
 
The technological park of Sophia Antipolis is characterized by the predominance of the 
small and medium sized enterprises (SME's). The number of employees per firm is on 
average 13 with very large disparities (see Chart 2).  
!
Through different criteria of segmentation (size, workforce...), we can observe the 
dominant share of the Information technology sector. Such IT sector includes 325 firms 
and hires 13.425 people. 
Even if the average number of employees in the IT sector is 42, about thirty enterprises 
hire more or less 100 people. The five biggest employers in Sophia Antipolis belong to 
the IT sector (see table 3). Of a total of 325 companies, the 10 biggest enterprises in term 
of workforce in the IT's sector represent 42.5% of the total workforce of this sector. 
 
 
Chart 2: Average number of employees per firm in Sophia Antipolis 
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Among the five biggest companies, three of them were forced by the public 
administration to locate in Sophia-Antipolis from the early years of the technological 
park. These two enterprises are Air-France, Thales (formerly Thomson) and Schneider 
Automation (formerly Télémécanique) (Table 3). It is somewhat disturbing to note that 
none of these five companies has its headquarters in Sophia Antipolis. This is a very 
negative factor for the coordination of productive activities within the technology park. 
 
 Admittedly, 65% of the companies in Sophia Antipolis have located their 
headquarters in the technologic park but the 35% remaining percentage correspond to the 
biggest companies in term of industrial activity and workforce. In the aim of promoting 
the IT sector in Sophia Antipolis, the French Government decided to create a pole of 
competitiveness devoted to secure networks (Solutions communicantes Sécurisées)6.  

scs.org/-http://www.pole 6 

The Interministerial Regional Planning and Development Committee (CIADT) 
decided in December 2002 a new industrial strategy based on the development of 
competitive clusters7.  
 
 
Table 3: The 5 biggest employers in Sophia Antipolis
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Such a policy lies on increasing the French industrial potential and on creating the 
conditions to foster the emergence of new activities with a high international profile. This 
strategy is based on active partnership between Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
(SMEs), research centres and training institute (either from the public or the private 
sector). It is expected that such cooperation promotes the emergence of synergies and 
cooperative efforts. A competitive cluster is a partnership association built on innovative 
projects. The French poles of competitiveness are inherently considered as devices of 
skills and knowledge networking that aims to link public researches institutes, 
Universities, SME's and large firms ("grand comptes") in order build innovative products 
that can be developed, marketed and can compete at the international level. This type of 
structure allows SMEs to develop, and researches to be directly applied on the industrial 
sector. 
 

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 The Interdepartmental Committee for land planning and regional attractiveness (Comité interministériel 
d’aménagement, de développement du territoire et d’attractivité régionale, CIADT), chaired by the Prime 
Minister decides the orientation of national policy planning. 
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By referring to Hobday works (Hobday, 2000), the French economic policy of 
poles of competitiveness can be qualified as projects based organisations (PBOs). Each 
competitive cluster draws up a five-year plan, based on a vision shared by the various 
stakeholders. With the plan, the competitiveness cluster can develop partnerships 
between the various stakeholders, constructs shared strategic R&D projects that can 
benefit from public funding - particularly the Interministeriel Fund (FUI) - and promotes 
an overall environment favourable to innovation and to the competitiveness cluster's 
stakeholders.  
 
Governments all over the world have invested huge amount of public money to 
attract industries they consider strategic4. According to Porter (1998), clusters are defined 
as: "geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and institutions in a 
particular field.". Furthermore, Porter (1990) affirms that the nation's competitiveness is 
directly linked to the attractiveness of their territorial productive conditions. The main 
idea of cluster policies promoted by the DATAR in France is very simple: geographic 
proximity facilitates the collective innovation. In a Local System of Innovation (LSI), 
positive externalities can emerge more easily. Sophia-Antipolis on the French Riviera is a 
concrete example of the benefits of the geographical proximity of innovative firms. The 
“technopolis” was created to attract high value added activities in the region, in the aim 
of strengthening a local economy driven historically by tourism. The creation of Sophia 
Antipolis forty years ago was, from the beginning, strongly supported by the French 
government by substantial public investments in telecommunication and transports 
infrastructure. There is a phenomenon of agglomeration in any local system of 
innovation.  
 
Even in competitions, firms tend to gather themselves in a small territory. 
Agglomeration externalities have positive productivity effects. According to Paul 
Krugman (1991), the agglomeration externalities arise from an interaction between 
economies of scale that generate increasing returns, transportation costs, and regional 
market potential. The concept of "increasing returns to adoption" (IRA) referring to a 
chain of development where a system or artefact becomes increasingly more attractive to 
potential users and its generalization increasingly beneficial to them. A major part of the 
high technology market is subject to increasing returns to adoption. IRA are also presents 
in any technological park. Like the model presented by Arthur (1989), more entreprises 
in a Local System of Innovation is, the more attractive it becomes.  The increasing return 
to adoption effect is at work. 
 
The best example of a successful positive externality is the birth of the firm 
Amadeus in Sophia Antipolis. Some 2 035 People are working in Sophia Antipolis for 
the Amadeus Company. Amadeus emerged thanks to the innovative atmosphere of the 
Sophia Antipolis technopole. Agglomeration externalities foster labor productivity, rents, 
and wages in regions with high economic density. Consequently agglomeration 
externalities can be considered as public goods. Like for any public goods, public 
authorities must intervene to promote positives externalities and increasing returns to 
scale.  
 
Despite to appearances and some success stories like Amadeus, the role of the 
French public authorities for developing positives externalities in Sophia Antipolis was 
not so successful. Unfortunately, the cluster of Sophia-Antipolis is rich of external 
linkages, but poor of internal relations between the firms.  
)
In this local system of Innovation, a large numbers of actors in different sectors are 
present but any of them is sufficiently dominant to drive the cluster orientations. In this 
sense, this Local System of Innovation is not reliable in the long run. Very few, almost 
no technological collaborations can be observed. The sustainability of the Sophia-
Antipolis cluster does not really depend on the territory. There is no interdependence 
among local actors or with the immediate environment. According to Christian Longhi 
(1999), the weakness of the cooperation between companies of the cluster can be 
partially explained by the local multinational firms which have their branch facilities 
located in the local system of innovation but at the same time their head office external to 
the cluster with main decision taken from outside, limiting the potential for local 
synergies and local collaboration. Admittedly, a region needs good infrastructure and a 
pool of educated talent to develop innovative clusters. Nevertheless, public authorities 
can't manufacture innovation by putting a set of buildings, financial incentives or 
transportation facilities next to a university and next to research centres. 
 
The endogenous factors able to promote growth in the technological park are on the 
one hand, the existence of communities of practice and other hand, strong and reliable 
interactions between the different communities of practice. Somehow, there is a 
community of practice within the engineering sector of computing, Information and 
Communication. There is some mobility of engineers in the various businesses of the 
park. In addition, many research projects with universities and public research 
laboratories, promote the emergence of a common culture.  
 
This community of practice is reinforced by a rich cultural context (many cultural, 
religious and sports associations). The English language plays an important role in the 
emergence of a community of practice in the IT sector. Even if Sophia Antipolis is in 
France, the working language is English for the main companies in the IT sector. A large 
number of expat workers strengthens the anglo-saxon character of Sophia-Antipolis. On 
the French Riviera, in the English Langage, a local radio is broadcasted with specific 
programs locally set-up, a weekly newspaper and a monthly magazine are published. 
Moreover, people living and working in Sophia Antipolis can shop at a British 
bookseller, at a British supermarket and even use the services of many British craftsmen 
in many different activities. 
 
 
3. The Top Down approach and the role of the Incubators  
 
Different types of incubators exist in Sophia-Antipolis.  First of all, we have to 
notice that the term incubator in France is equivalent to a pre-incubator in the anglo-
saxon sense. Then a start-up which meets success in a French pre-incubator can follow its 
activities in a business incubator called “pépinière”. Since in France the research is 
mainly held by public structure, the government decided in 1999 to create pre-incubators 
dedicated to valuation of public research. This type of pre-incubators, called “Allegre 
incubators” referring to the name of the French education ministry of this period 
(Prof.Dr. Claude Allègre), have the mission to favour the transfer of technologies 
developed in the public research laboratories towards the private through new business 
start-up8. These pre-incubators can propose a coaching, the financing of outside services 

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 The public incubators "Allegre" depend on the Ministry of Higher Education and Research and aims to 
promote research with the creation of private enterprise. 
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such as a market study or patent registration, an integration to their close networks and a 
hosting. Their generally principle is a refundable advance in case of success for projects 
holder. Several Engineer or Business Schools, which are quite wealthy in France and also 
some public research institutes have created their own pre-incubators. Their aim is to 
support the projects of new business start-up of their former students or their researchers. 
 
Some pre-incubators are dedicated to a specific public (women for example) and 
their existence is related to the local economic context and they are financed by public 
actors such as economic development agencies or competitiveness poles. In the end, 
some private pre-incubators exist. These structures differ from the first ones by their will 
of profitability. They work as a general rule by taking part with a capital of the company 
to realize a capital gain. Their economic model having survived with great difficulty the 
explosion of the internet bubble, the great majority of these incubators disappeared or 
reconverted as venture capital or in consulting companies. Several other structures 
(public, private or associative) are involved in the supporting the creation of the new 
business start-up. They are public or semi-public structures like the Business Innovation 
Centre (BIC)9. The BIC was created by the European Commission to foster innovation in 
the companies in order to strengthen an economic dynamics leaning on the local 
potential. BIC are distributed in the whole of the countries of the European Union. 50 
technology parks, 33 BIC and 30 pre-incubators for public research are now linked by an 
association called RETIS. The vision is that these three structures have a complementary 
role (see chart 3).  
 
In Sophia-Antipolis are located :  
• One ‘Allegre’ pre-incubator’ called “Incubateur PACA Est” 
• The Business Innovation Centre (BIC) called “Antipolis Innovation Campus” 
• The SKEMA Business School pre-incubator 
• The Telecom Paris Tech pre-incubator 
• Several private business centres that host enterprises providing them services 
 
What we can observe is that the incubators of Sophia Antipolis are focused on 
research and innovation. Other structures are dedicated to ‘traditional’ entrepreneurship 
(handcraft, commerce and trade). For example a ’Couveuse’ is a structure dedicated to 
support small business projects. An entrepreneur who as such a project can start his 
activity being supported by the ‘couveuse’ (council, formation, logistic) and will have 
very few administrative obligations so that he will be able to test quickly his business 
model during a short period of few months : he will contract with the ‘Couveuse’ so that 
he will be allowed to use the company registration number of the structure as if it was its 
own. 
 

They were born of the Law on Innovation and Research of the July 12, 1999. 28 incubators certified by the 
Department are spread throughout France. 
To benefit from this type of device, the project must be backed by a public research laboratory or be 
winner of the national support for the creation of innovative technology companies, organized by the 
Ministry of Higher Education and research.Allègre incubators offer assistance for a period of 24 months. 
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Table 4 : The actors concerned by an entrepreneurial project according to the target 
activity  
 
Activity Targeted Incubation structure 
dedicated 
Actors dedicated 
Handcraft 
(hairdressing, 
plumber, etc…) 
 
Couveuses, pépinière des 
communautés 
d’agglomérations  
Chambre des Métiers et de 
l’Artisanat 
Commerce and trade Couveuses, pépinière des 
communautés 
d’agglomérations 
 
Economic Chamber of 
Commerce 
Innovative business IBEC Economic Chamber of 
Commerce, OSEO 
Research valorization 
 
State Incubators OSEO 
 
As pointed out by Romana Rauter, the coordination of economic activities in the cluster 
lies partly on the capacity of SME’s to develop their absorptive capacity. Admittedly, the 
incubators have a disseminating capacity of knowledge but the SME must be able to 
absorb such a disseminated knowledge (see Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
 
Table 5: Impact of the incubators in Sophia-Antipolis on the main factors of growth 
traditionally at work in any innovative pole 
 
Factors of 
growth 
Impact of the 
incubators Main explanation 
Agglomeration 
externalities Medium 
Few incubated firms collaborate together 
and gather information. Very few 
agglomerations externalities excepting 
the Amadeus Company can be observed. 
Externalities 
from education Very strong 
The University of Nice - Sophia 
Antipolis is the main actor in the 
promotion of entrepreneurship in the 
cluster 
Networks 
externalities Weak 
The increasing returns to adoption 
obtained by incubated firms are not 
really observed. After several decades, 
Sophia Antipolis cannot be qualified as 
an innovative network enable to generate 
positive externalities. 

Non pecuniary 
externalities 
(information 
spillover) Medium 
An innovative atmosphere exists in the 
cluster but mainly rely on informal 
relationships betweens workers. For 
instance  in sports, in cultural or 
religious events. 
Factors of 
growth 
Impact of the 
incubators Main explanation 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The fundamental factor for a successful innovation transfer system in Sophia Antipolis 
lies in the existence of a public-private partnership. Thanks to a strong commitment of 
the Government or its local representatives, innovation transfer systems can emerge. The 
Government is the only legitimate body to guaranty space organization. Consequently, 
one of the main responsibilities of the public authorities is to facilitate the flow of 
informations between different actors, to be a network mediator, and to assist firms 
through the sharing of information. Nevertheless, the successful of such a top-down 
strategy relies on the ability to set up a reliable coordination between firms located in the 
cluster. 
  
The French authorities pride themselves on having created in Sophia Antipolis a 
"Silicon Valley" in comparison with the California's famous technopolis in the United 
States. Admittedly, in terms of workforce, Sophia Antipolis is the biggest Technological 
Park in The Europe but the comparison reaches its end to that point. Concerning the 
famous technological park Silicon Valley in California, even if the public authorities 
helped, by financial incentives or transportation facilities, to the economic growth of this 
territory (top-down approach), the innovative atmosphere which had emerged from this 
park is rooted in the private dynamics of the innovative SMEs (Bottom-up approach). 
 
After four decades of existence, the reliability and the sustainability of Sophia-
Antipolis is still to be proven. Admittedly, the incubators, the industrial atmosphere, the 
University environment and agglomeration effects are very important for the success of 
the Top-down strategy that governs the development of Sophia Antipolis but all these 
factors can not alone explain the continuing growth of this park. 
 
The world is full of spaces offering tax incentives, efficient means of transport and 
a pleasant living environment. The factors of attractiveness of the Sophia Antipolis 
technological park are actually to be found outside the park. Expatriate workers who 
arrive in France with their families can benefit from education and health systems 
virtually free. For a salary equal to their country of origin, their disposable income is 
much more important. This is one of the main reasons why France is the first home in 
Europe for foreign direct investment. 

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